[Responding to questions and criticisms of Sir Hugh Dalton
(Labor) and others]
SIR ANTHONY EDEN, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs
(Warwick and Leamington, C.) said that he could assure the House there was no
question of these anxious difficulties [expressed by Israel] being anywhere
near the bottom of the list in the Government’s preoccupations. Now that for
the moment they had a breathing space in the European difficulties this particular
matter, especially the Arab-Israel dispute, was near the top of the list.
The
three-Power declaration of 1950 [WebDoc #1] went far beyond our commitment in
SEATO; for instance, we should go to the aid of Israel, and it was also binding
on the United States and France, if she were attacked by the Arab States, and vice versa. But there was no such
obligation under the agreement just made with Egypt in respect of a conflict
with Israel. We were pledged to go to the aid of Egypt only if she were invaded
by a Power from outside the Middle East.
He did
not want to give the House a detailed list of the Government’s ideas about
redeployment of our forces. [- - -]
The
Government would make arms deliveries only on the basis of the 1950 declaration
– they would continue to keep a balance between Israel and the Arab States.
(Cheers.) The last thing he wanted was an arms race in that part of the world.
It would be disastrous in the present inflamed atmosphere. (Cheers.)
He had
taken more personal trouble over the unhappy story of the refugees in the
Middle East than over anything else he had done, and he had been singularly
unsuccessful. He was beginning to doubt whether there could be much headway
unless there could be general political discussions. [- - -] The Government
would continue to do everything they could to try to find a solution [to the
refugee problem].
PROMISE OF COOPERATION
There was more cooperation between
the Egyptian authorities and ourselves. [- - -] He hoped the House would give
the [Anglo-Egyptian] agreement a chance to work out. He did not believe the
Government could bring assistance to anybody in the Middle East unless they
could make some kind of success of the agreement.
The
House ought not to under-estimate Israel’s real military strength, which was certainly
at least greater than that of any single Arab State, and that was a very low
estimate. (Laughter.) While the Government gave due weight to the anxieties
expressed over Israel, they should not be exaggerated too much.
REDUCING TENSION – FRESH EFFORTS BEGUN
There
was for Israel a heavy economic strain in keeping their military effort going,
which was another reason why Britain must seek to reduce that tension, so that
Israel equally with the Arab States could devote more of her resources to improving
the economic wealth of the Middle East. The Government would neglect no chance
of negotiation. They had already established certain contacts, but he could not
yet say whether they would lead to anything. They would do everything in their
power to reduce the differences, but there could be no quick results. In this
case it was like a Trieste problem; one had to go underground a little in
trying to get an agreement.
In the
Government’s view, Egypt was acting unlawfully in stopping strategic cargoes bound
for Israel going through the Suez Canal, and they did not accept the Egyptian
argument based on the claim to be exercising a belligerent right, which they
derived from Article 10 of the 1888 convention.
There
was no evidence of the persecution of the Jews of Egypt. [- - -]
The Times (London),
Wednesday, November 3, 1954, p.7.
