[- - -] Interview was reassuring in the sense that he
firmly disclaimed any intention of embarking on further reprisals and confirmed
both his dislike of the use of force and his conviction that it did not help in
the long run. Since, however, he would not say that in no circumstances would
another reprisal raid take place, I gave him, at dictation speed, a serious
warning of the consequences to Israel-United Kingdom relations and Israel’s
future.
2. The Prime
Minister said he would like me to know that it had been no part of Gaza plan to
cause heavy Egyptian casualties and that he deeply regretted them. When I said
that this demonstrated the danger of supposing that effects of using force
could be calculated, he replied that this had been a “politico-military lesson”
which would not be lost on the Israeli Government or Army.
3. Turning to the
Security Council aspect, Mr Sharett said he realised that Israel was bound to
be condemned. He earnestly trusted, however, that the Council – and
particularly representatives of the Western Powers in their speeches – would
not ignore the Israel case and pretend that the Gaza attack had come out of a
clear sky. He did not ask us to agree that Egyptian action justified Israeli
action, but he hoped that in the interests of rebuilding confidence in the
armistice machinery, some recognition would be given to the injuries Israel had
suffered and the real difficulties of her position.
4. I said that a
third topic would no doubt be raised at the Security Council – namely the
methods of preventing further trouble on the Gaza frontier. I hoped that
Israel, whether or not she believed in the efficacy of the measures proposed by
General Burns, would show herself willing to make a genuine effort to try these
and any other constructive proposals.
5. Mr Sharett took
the point and said that Israel would certainly agree to consider in a
constructive spirit any proposals which were put forward. His only reservation
would be that they must not encroach on Israel sovereignty. When I said that
General Burns had always shown understanding on this score, Mr Sharett said he
entirely agreed.
SOURCE: Nicholls to Foreign Office, tgm.69, March
8, 1955, TNA FO371/115897 VR1092/69.
