Washington, 16 April
1955
Secret
Dear Mr. Prime Minister,
I have received, through
your Ambassador in Washington, the text of your letter to me of April 12, 1955. Your statement of the problems which the present situation in the Middle East
presents for Israel is most helpful, and I welcome the clear and constructive
manner in which you have presented your Government’s point of view.
Ambassador Eban will have
advised you that I discussed with him in some detail the points raised in your
communication and let him know the direction which my thinking has been taking
in dealing with the problems of peace and security in the area.
I am particularly pleased
by your reference to the question of the division of the waters of the Jordan
valley. We believe the Jordan Development Plan should stand on its own merits
and not be dependent on other solutions, but if this question could be
resolved, we would all be encouraged to hope that a broader settlement of
outstanding issues might be possible.
I feel I should let you
know quite frankly our difficulties with regard to the security arrangement
which you suggest. Up to the present time, the United States has not entered
into any security treaty, except in the Western Hemisphere, unless the treaty
was directed against the expansionist threat of international communism. We
have steadfastly avoided involvement in regional controversies. For instance,
we insisted that the Manila Pact stipulate that the “aggression and armed
attack” referred to in that Pact should apply only to “communist aggression”. A
security treaty with Israel would require the consent of the Senate. If we
presented to the Senate a treaty with Israel today, many Senators would feel
that they were not being asked to guarantee stability but, rather, to guarantee
United States involvement in a highly inflammatory dispute. In order to obtain
the Senate’s consent, I feel confident that the major issues between Israel and
her neighbors would have to be brought measurably nearer solution.
I have been giving the
matter serious study for the past few months, and have come out with the
following basic conclusions:
1. No formal treaty
guarantee of Israel or her neighbors would meet with the approval of the United
States Senate or the American people unless there was a reasonable chance of
stability in the area. This would require substantial progress toward a
settlement of the major outstanding issues.
2. In our view, such a
settlement is not unobtainable.
3. The United States
Government is ready to exert every effort to achieve such a settlement and is
giving earnest thought to the questions of procedure and timing.
I am confident you will
agree that a favorable outcome of our endeavor would be jeopardized by any
public intimation of our efforts at this time. Success will also depend, of
course, on the maintenance of an atmosphere of tranquility in the area during
the crucial period ahead.
I shall be glad to receive
further thoughts from you at any time, by letter or through your Ambassador
here.
With every good wish and
my heartiest personal greetings, I remain.
Sincerely yours,
John Foster Dulles
SOURCE: FRUS 1955-1957, XIV, doc.79.
