Paris, 26 October 1955
Top Secret
Foreign Minister conversed 90 minutes with Dulles. Eban,
Lawson, Russell, McArthur present. Foreign Minister made following main points
in detailed survey:
(1) Arms deal marks
grave development for Israel for Middle East and for world. On world plane new
factor enters region with disturbing effects its previous equilibrium. In
Foreign Minister's view USA should reach conclusion relaxation tension
indivisible. There's little value relaxation one continent and aggravation
another. Soviets should be confronted clear choice either apply detente
everywhere or have West lose faith their basic sincerity on Geneva spirit.
(2) Nasser should
be faced clear choice renounce arms deal or lose Western aid. Cannot have it
both ways for if he does both Egypt and Arab world will conclude his
rapprochement Soviets has been successful and others should emulate. Both here
and in (1) above perils acquiescence greater than dangers clear confrontation
USSR and Egypt with injurious consequences their new policy to their basic
interest.
(3) Israel faced
grave perils. Previous Egyptian preponderance now being overwhelmingly
increased. Nasser seeks destruction Israel and his new strength primarily
directed this purpose. In face fearful prospect not surprising to hear world
press speculate on Israel refusal to wait for adversary becoming overpoweringly
stronger. Foreign Minister hoped devoutly no situation would arise in which
this appeared only course safety but mere discussion of it illustrated
explosive elements situation. But supposing Israel kept nerve as he hoped it
would do the paramount danger was Egyptian offensive to annihilate Israel.
Israel would then fight back desperately stopping before nothing and whole
Middle East might then be turned into inferno. Question was find effective
deterrents. Here Foreign Minister gave details Egypt's previous superiority
even before Czech deal.
(4) Only devices
which might remedy situation were first arms which we need urgently and on
special terms and which shall seek partly in USA and second quick unconditional
action on security treaty which idea Secretary so often and consistently
sponsored. If not to be implemented now in emergency, than what was value of
idea. If transpired US unready for security treaty present juncture, Israel will
probably write it off as illusory. Foreign Minister invited Secretary's frank
comment on all above.
Secretary
commented:
(1) He shared
Foreign Minister's view gravity situation carrying threat not only Israel but
world. Soviet arms would also probably reach Syria, Saudi Arabia forming arms
pool inimical not only Israel but Europe which depended Arab oil. Britain
specially affected because of regional interests and dependence on Arab oil
without which her foreign exchange position would collapse. Development as
serious as any since World War II not even excluding Korea wherein Communist
objectives more limited. USA proposes deal with matter in light this grave
appraisal.
(2) Foreign
Minister's contention that Turkish-Iraqi pact brought Soviet and Egypt together
was open to challenge but no purpose arguing on past.
(3) USA regards
Geneva spirit as indivisible and saw little value in Geneva operation if new
front opened in Middle East with designs Africa, Europe. In its relations
Soviet America would apply this doctrine. Method and timing of confrontation
USSR this choice needed careful judgment meanwhile publicity would not help.
(4) He doubted if
ultimatum to Nasser renounce arms deal or lose western aid would be effective.
Nasser would not yield and western aid not sufficiently decisive make him
renounce deal to which committed. Dulles felt more to be hoped for on Soviet
than Egyptian end. Course suggested by Foreign Minister had been discussed and
Dulles' present thinking not definitive. This matter still subject to review.
(5) USA
appreciation relative arms strength before Czech deal not same as Foreign
Minister's. Pentagon and US Intelligence had different figures which do not
bear out belief Egyptian superiority. Would be useful attempt to reconcile
these different versions.
(6) New arms deal certainly gave rise to anxiety but
whether would cause decisive Israel inferiority not clear. Would Egypt get all
arms and be able use them, how many would be killed flying these planes etc.
Other hand USA does not believe that if USSR decides create imbalance Israel
can prevent it since absorptive capacity Israel for weapons even if brought to
100 per cent would be less than that of larger neighbours. Thus balance
principle not feasible. This does not exclude purchase arms on moderate basis
and if Israel applies in this spirit USA will consider sympathetically.
(7) On security
treaty USA opposed aggression by anyone regards Israel as permanent element
international life and no attempt destroy or disrupt Israel possible without
strong USA reaction. Question is what form should this USA purpose take. He
compelled to say extremely doubtful at present time possible transform policy
statement into formal instrument. Not quite certain if Senate ratification available
and anyhow until January impossible get clear view. He lunched with Senator
George and left with strong doubt if two thirds available. Foreign Minister
enquired if senator himself opposed treaty. Secretary said he was thinking far
more of Senator's estimate situation than of his individual attitude though
even this seemed hesitant. But he would not pass buck Senator George would
simply say even if recommended by Executive doubtful what attitude Senate would
be. In August speech he expressed hope armistice lines could be recognised as
final borders with some adjustments neither serious nor insuperable. However
problem security treaty not basically legal, question was if America people via
Senate prepared bold involvement in crisis. When he got back USA, he might find
public opinion and Senate attitude different but fact is for next few months we
must live on basis present policy and this could not be reconsidered till
Congress met first month 1956.
(8) He hoped Israel
would not draw conclusions that only security lay preventative war. Such war
would not solve any problems even if Israel won. Any initiative of Israel would
seriously embarrass USA whose policy statements were conceived on basis
opposition any aggression. Israel gained from opposite side this coin. He did
not wish to threaten but must point out USA could not help country which went
against basic policy principle of non-use of force.
(9) Main solution was peace
with Arabs. The more attempt is delayed the harder it becomes. If settlement achieved
1954 would have been better for Israel than now and if now better than next
year.
(10) Israel has
tremendous asset in good will America people both Jewish and general. Important
maintain good will support American nation behind policy to protect Israel. If
this friendship not existed not even treaty would bring about active
intervention. Indeed treaties only valuable when then express genuine American
desire help other countries be safe. He would work every way open to him secure
this safety.
Ninety minutes had
elapsed and Secretary suggested further meeting [in] Geneva to hear Foreign
Minister's comments [and] continue [to] exchange views.
SOURCE:
