We had four
meetings with the Secretary General, lasting 9 hours. In addition to these, he
had a conversation with me, lasting one hour, in the car from Lydda to
Jerusalem. He started by explaining the background to his mission, how it all
evolved, and described two initiatives which he had succeeded in squelching,
one British and one American. The British one was Selwyn Lloyd’s, who proposed
to start discussing the formation of some international military force for
guarding the borders or controlling them. He saw this idea as an absolutely
senseless and unimplementable one, which could not but be rejected by the
sides, by Russia; one which would only complicate things. He succeeded in
totally eradicating this idea. Then there was an American initiative to
establish a high international authority in the form of a committee or
trusteeship, and he succeeded in eradicating this idea too.
This
story was in itself true, but it was told with the clear intention of proving
what kind of troubles we had been facing and how he had saved us from them, and
how much we should appreciate his own proposals, as against those former ones
which, from the point of view of infringing of our sovereignty and complicating
our matters and [international] relations, were by far less extreme than his
previous ones.
He said
that when the proposal was put forth to convene the Security Council, he did
not want the procedure that was ultimately taken. He thought that he should
convene the Council and that it should not adopt any resolution, but only ask
him to take on this mission, thus enabling him to come here completely free and
without creating any high-flown expectations of this mission. The compromise
reached was that this would not appear as a clear Western initiative, which
would have immediately raised the opposition of the Soviet Union and thus lead
to the convening of the SC in an atmosphere of conflict between the Powers.
Therefore, it was the United States alone which asked to convene the Council, thereby
preventing the move from being seen as an act of collusion against the Soviet
Union. Second, against his wishes, a resolution was adopted by the Council
asking him to clarify the situation and especially charged him with easing the
tension, etc.
He
explained that he intended to focus on the easing of tension along the borders,
mainly the Israel-Egyptian border, but others as well, and this according to
previous Security Council resolutions, mainly three resolutions which were
adopted after the Gaza operation, the Khan-Yunes operation and the Kinneret
operation.
We stressed the first item of his mission, which was an investigation of the
procedure of implementing all aspects of the Armistice Agreements.{*}
NOTE: The wording
of the second clause of Resolution 113 [WebDoc #107] reads as follows:
“2. Requests the Secretary-General to undertake, as a matter of
urgent concern, a survey of the various aspects of enforcement of and
compliance with the four General Armistice Agreements and the Council's
resolutions under reference.”
Throughout the
conversations we argued that, if the Security Council had gone out if its way
and had sent the Secretary-General himself to the region, it would be very
strange if he dealt only with small things and would not attack the problem in
all its depth, if he didn’t ask what has happened to the Armistice Agreements,
what were the unimplemented points, why hadn’t they been implemented, if he didn’t
make an effort to inject a new spirit into the implementation of the Armistice
Agreements, if he didn’t mend basic faults which have been created with the
passage of time.
He
couldn’t avoid admitting that this was his task, and consequently our discussion
shifted from one axis to the other. Naturally, his axis remained, but an
equilibrium has been attained between the two axes.{*}
NOTE: The SG throughout emphasized the third article in Resolution 113 [WebDoc #107], which reads as follows: “3. Requests the Secretary-General to arrange with the parties for the adoption of any measures which, after discussion with the parties and with the Chief of Staff, he considers would reduce existing tensions along the armistice demarcation lines, including the following points: (a) Withdrawal of their forces from the armistice demarcation lines; (b) Full freedom of movement for United Nations observers along the armistice demarcation lines, in the demilitarized zones and in the defensive areas; (c) Establishment of local arrangements for the prevention of incidents and the prompt detection of any violations of the Armistice Agreements.”
What I
have said so far was more or less what was covered in our first conversation
which was private, informal, without minutes taken. I was with Eytan, he was
with Burns. Later, in the following conversations, when we sat around a table,
they were four and we were eight, if I am not mistaken. [- - -]
He
began with the subject of the commitment to avoid any hostile action, as
required in Article II para. 2, which we had discussed between ourselves and
Burns even before Hammarskjöld’s arrival, and seemingly we had reached
agreement. He wanted to lend this agreement a more solemn form and therefore
proposed that we should again fix a date and time at which it would come into
force. Initially he proposed that this commitment would cover three points: a
prohibition of shooting over the border; a prohibition against crossing the
border; a prohibition against coming near the border, which meant the
distancing of military forces. Here he clung to a promise given to Burns that,
in order to help Hammarskjöld with his mission, we would agree for a short
while to desist from continuing our patrols exactly along the border line.
Hammarskjöld wanted to enhance and consolidate this, but we refused him. We
said this was a short-term agreement; Nasser had created here a false
equilibrium, as if he too desists from sending patrols while in reality the
Egyptians have no patrolling. Nasser needs no patrolling, for there are no
infiltrators crossing over into Egyptian territory from our side, and no mines
are laid on his side of the border. In fact, by agreeing to desist he desists
from nothing at all. The commitment thus covers [only] two points: avoidance of
opening fire at targets on the other side of the border, and [avoidance] of
crossing the border. We shall stick to these two, but we told him that he can
be fully confident that we shall not consider this commitment as something
absolute. It should be clear that if, because of a security consideration we
shall have to come near the border or to move along it we shall do that. [CoS]
Dayan, who also participated in the talks, gave him an example. If, for
instance, people from the other side cross into our territory and start
harvesting in our fields, what are we to do? Should we appeal to the UN and
wait until an Observer arrives, or send a force and throw them out? If a
necessary arises, we shall get to the border line, but we will do this only
under sheer necessity, not as a matter of routine. Hammarskjöld was satisfied
with this arrangement and this was confirmed in writing by the Prime Minister.
Hammarskjöld
fixed the time for the implementation of this commitment for 18:oo yesterday,
and received an Egyptian announcement that strict orders were issued to execute
the commitment included in Article II para. 2.
We
agreed and said that we were prepared to exclude Article II para. 2 from the
Armistice Agreement articles as a whole, and make a special, unconditional
commitment regarding this article as long as the other side fulfills it.
However, this did not pertain to all other articles of the Armistice
Agreements. We said that we were ready to commit ourselves to implementing all
articles of the Armistice Agreement, but we want such a commitment from the
other side too. At this point a sharp debate ensued around the issue of free
maritime passage, and what we are now bringing before the Cabinet for its
decision are two poignant questions: one which we put before Hammarskjöld and
one which he put before us.
In our
letter to Hammarskjöld we argued that, if indeed Egypt undertakes to curtail
all hostile acts, it should be clear to her that avoiding such acts means
avoiding interfering with [our] shipping through the Suez Canal and the Gulf of
Eilat, for such interference is a hostile act. This is how we interpret the
Armistice Agreement and this is the interpretation given by Ralph Bunche, the
father of the agreement, in his statement before the Security Council when he
summed up the process of reaching the Armistice Agreements. He then used the
term of “shipping” generally, and he meant shipping in the Mediterranean. At
the time he was anxious about interference with shipping in the Mediterranean,
not in the Suez Canal or the Gulf of Eilat, and we are relying on his statement
which was recorded in the Security Council minutes, black on white. Moreover,
this was confirmed by the Security Council when it discussed this issue in
September 1951. The issue discussed then was shipping through the Suez Canal,
but the argumentation and basis covered shipping in general. There is no doubt
that this pertains to the Gulf of Eilat. The Egyptians claim that they are in a
state of war with Israel and thus they are allowed to prohibit Israeli shipping
in the Suez. The Security Council did not say: “indeed you are in a state of
war, but you are not allowed to do that in the Suez.” Rather it said: “You are
not in a state of war. This claim of yours is false. You are not allowed to do anything
because you are not in a state of war with Israel.”
Hammarskjöld
was not too happy with having to deal with this matter. He argued on two
levels, one on principle, the other political-practical. His first argument was
this: You are aware of my personal attitude, of my position, but I must act
within a certain framework. Indeed, according to the Security Council
resolution the Egyptian behavior is hard and in contradiction to the Armistice
Agreement regime, but the Security Council did not say that this is a violation
of any of the agreement’s articles. And the question whether this is a
violation of some specific article is open and can have different answers. He
also tried to argue that this issue has never been discussed in the Mixed
Armistice Commission. This is not correct. It was discussed and all discussions
were in our favor.
Hammarskjöld’s
political-practical argument was that this issue is as difficult as the parting
of the Red Sea. It is highly complicated. Egypt is entangled here with other
Arab states, and it has turned into a difficult issue of principle. He said
that we may be surprised to learn that Egypt is perhaps the most moderate Arab
country on this issue. Therefore he believes that urgent and practical
problems, the doing away with the danger of clashes should be dealt with first.
Later on, when a more peaceful atmosphere sets in, it would perhaps be possible
to deal with this issue with some chance of a solution.
We
rejected this position. Here we pressed him most hard, and he was compelled to
give way on his entrenched position. We said that we saw this issue as one of
the main ones, that one cannot doubt that it is a hostile act. If the stopping
of an Israeli ship sailing to an Israeli port by Egyptian military forces who
are threatening to sink it is not an aggressive act, then it is not clear at
all what an aggressive act is. If the sailing of an Israeli ship to an Israeli
port is not a lawful act, then it is impossible to know what a lawful act is.
Moreover,
this question has already arisen. If we shall not insist on its solution it
would mean that we have acquiesced with the theory that it is not to be seen as
a hostile act, or that it is a hostile act which the Armistice Agreement
doesn’t prohibit, and this is clearly impossible. We charged him to most
seriously discuss this issue with the Egyptians and prove to them that they
must desist from doing that. If they do not, it would be clear cut [proof] that
they are violating the Armistice Agreement, and then the question will arise
whether the commitment [now being sought by the SG] is all-encompassing, or a
selective one allowing them to choose what to implement and what not.
It is
clear to me that he will have to bring up this question before the Egyptians
and then bring us an answer. He would by no means be able to extricate himself
from discussing this issue in Cairo within the framework of his present
mission. If this does not happen, then I have been seriously wrong in my
understanding of the situation.
At the
same time Hammarskjöld raised a very serious question. He is charged with
reducing the tension, and for this purpose he wants to establish defense
arrangements that would guarantee the implementation of the Armistice
Agreements along the lines already accepted by Security Council resolutions.
This is to be achieved by enhancing the UN Observers’ authority and tasks. He
presented us with a paper which included five points:
(1) Along the
border, on both sides, permanent observation posts of UN Observers would be
established and they would be allowed to man them anytime. We would have no
right to stop them, but they would have to notify us before they come. Burns
said that the Egyptians have long ago agreed with this proposal, and indeed
several such posts were established in a few places on the Egyptian side. When
we asked what benefit these posts had brought about and what they had
prevented, he said that they were too few [to make a big difference, but] that
without these few the situation would have been worse. They had a preventive
function and helped in conducting investigations.
(2) UN Observers will be allowed to patrol
freely in the area, this too after informing us first.
(3) In the text of the Armistice Agreement
there is something called “a guarded zone” – these are zones close to the
border in which certain limitations on the quality and quantity of forces are
set up. Up until now when, for instance, one
side tabled a complaint regarding the other stationing forces above what is
allowed in this zone, or weapons which are prohibited there, then a UN Observer
would be allowed to come and investigate, then the MAC would discuss his report
and arrive at a decision. Now it is being proposed that the Observers would
enjoy freedom of movement and would not need our approval.
(4) According to
the fourth point, when the UN Observers want to get to an observation point or
in a guarded zone, they will do it using an itinerary provided by us.
(5) This is a
highly important point: when the commander of the UN Observers force believes
that within a strip of 5 km. along the border there is something which may lead
to a violation of the cease-fire, he has the right to send Observers to
investigate what is going on there. Thus, if we were planning a retaliation
operation and brought forces into this strip, the Observers would be allowed to
go there and look around.
We
debated this clause and Ben-Gurion said that we did not want to become a small
protectorate of the Security Council. Hammarskjöld answered in a not short
speech in which he explained the general background of the matter, saying that
the situation was very tense and explosive. The Security Council met. It
adopted resolutions several times in the past. The Council is worried about the
situation and believes it cannot avoid taking some steps. He clung to the
well-known judicial theory over which we have been long debating with him,
namely that the powers of the Observers are not based only on the Armistice
Agreements, but that they arise also from a certain earlier Security Council
resolution regarding the truce. He also hinted clearly that if we disagreed
with the UN, with the Security Council, this would not be beneficial to the
State of Israel. Generally, he used a fine, gentle language, but every hint was
made of steel. When he says that there is generally not a small confusion in
the public opinion regarding the situation, he really means that it is not
quite clear who is the aggressor, who is preparing for a war, who is scheming
for a war. When he says that we are conducting negotiations, he means that we
want arms, and the results of our talks with him may influence those
negotiations.
He
didn’t know that I had received a cable from [our embassy in] Canada regarding
arms negotiations which concluded with the following: much would depend on
whether the trust gained by the Israeli government thanks to its current
restraint and its avoiding [retaliatory] attack would continue; an impression
of Israel not cooperating with Hammarskjöld and his proposals may damage this
[trust]. Indeed, this is what he wished to tell us.
We told
him that the Armistice Agreement was the cornerstone of the whole edifice, that
this was the only thing serving as a buffer against chaos. The UN should be
interested, above all, in strict compliance with this structure; for if you
uproot one stone from the wall, you may upset it all and one cannot foresee how
it will end. Instead of a regime based on a clear and defined agreement,
supported by the moral authority of the UN, a situation may arise of utmost
anarchy and an utterly arbitrary domination of the Security Council over the
issue, while at the same time the Council would not have any concrete
responsibility for the situation.
At this point Ben-Gurion took the
floor, followed by CoS Dayan, and then by various other Ministers. Then Sharett
spoke again:
The CoS’s remarks
where perhaps God’s Truth, but they most certainly have not fully presented our
problem vis-à-vis the world today. How have we presented our problem? We
said that we are a state fighting for its survival, a state which has only
recently stood up on its feet, a state surrounded by enemies aiming at its
destruction, a state facing the real danger of aggression. What have we
demanded? We have demanded, first of all, that the world understand our
situation, we have demanded that the world help us defend ourselves by arms, we
have demanded that the world prevent aggression against us. In demanding all
this a direct or indirect accusation against the United Nations is interwoven –
a criticism of the United Nations’ total powerlessness and even its
unwillingness to take some concrete action. This is what we have been saying,
and this is what has been heard all over. No such criticism was ever pronounced
regarding any other problem. It was pronounced only regarding our problem. And
now the United Nations’ Security Council awoke and is prepared to intervene,
for if the United Nations doesn’t deliberate matters, if it does nothing, then
what is there to justify it very existence?
This is
the general background of the matter before us.
Of
course, mistakes can happen. Circumstances change. There are all kinds of
maneuvering behind the curtain, but as far as the world is concerned, the
Security Council has convened in order to deliberate on our problem. It has
made an effort. It has sent the Secretary-General to the region to find out
what can be done. Now a demand is being voiced for the UN to execute preventive
action, action which would forestall deterioration. If this preventive action
fails, it would be clear who is the aggressor – this would be at the core of
unanimous world public opinion – and that, first of all, everything possible
must be done to stop aggression. If this fails, then at least everyone would
know who is to blame.
The
Secretary-General has come and is putting forth certain proposals in accordance
with Security Council resolutions already adopted. The worst thing that can
happen is that a picture will emerge according to which we are saying “No” and
it is only we who are saying “No.” I am not arguing that we should accept these
proposals because of this consideration, but we should be aware that the world
[- - -] does not totally accept in unison the picture as painted by us. We are
constantly watched with a suspicion that we are striving for expansion, and
that we are certainly considering the waging of a preventive war. Such a
negative response by us may indeed be sealing a negative decision against us.
Now,
I’m quite experienced in explaining the sanctity of the Armistice Agreement
regime – in conversation with some individual it is possible to reach an
understanding of this matter. But general public opinion is not interested in
such niceties. It says that there is the United Nations, there is the Security
Council, and they should act; that if bringing about peace is impossible, let
there at least be a reduction in tension.
The
fact we are arguing that the Armistice Agreement was not intended to be
eternal, but should serve as a short transition to peace, has a boomerang
effect against us. Indeed, it was intended to be a short interval, but this has
not come to be. We have all succumbed to dreams; “the Arabs are all to blame.”
However, this doesn’t mean that the original agreement, now that it has become
clear that it will not serve as a transition to a speedy peace but has to exist
for a long time, should remain intact with all its small delicate points, that
nothing can be changed or amended or added. I think that in this respect there
is now an understanding between East and West. The last Soviet communiqué says
that the Soviet Union would give the necessary support to any means taken by
the United Nations with the aim of securing peace in the area of Palestine and
implementing the relevant resolution of the Security Council. I read it as a
support of Hammarskjöld’s mission, as seeing the United Nations as the
instrument which should and can take action. We should remember that the
Security Council resolution was adopted unanimously. I don’t know how we would
be able to hold on in our negotiations for arms in view if our dependence on
these matters [i.e., cooperating with Hammarskjöld].
At the
same time I am against accepting the 5th point [i.e., the right to send UN Observers
for investigations into a strip of 5 km along the border]. I am against it both
in principle and for a practical reason. The Secretary-General should be aware
that we have the right to disagree with him, for the moment he feels that we
must at all costs avoid clashing with him, we would be unable to conduct
negotiations with him. He must know that, not only can we disagree with him,
but that in principle he cannot compel us to accept whatever he decides. Practically,
we cannot start getting into compromises on this article. There is no sense in
us proposing a strip of one km instead of five. It’s ridiculous. He is getting
us to accept quite a high percentage of his proposals, and thus we can allow
ourselves to reject this point.
The
negotiations have not ended. We do not know how they will end. I am all for
continuing them and when necessary we would consult with the Cabinet.
The debate
continued. The operative decisions which were finally taken were not included
in the protocols, but it was decided: (1) To confirm the decisions regarding
observation posts and patrols
of UN Observers along the Gaza Strip; (2) To confirm the reply which would be
given by the Prime Minister to the Secretary-General. (Cf. Dayan’s summary of this Cabinet session in Avnei
Derekh, 188-89.)
