To the haverim,
I have been aware of the mood of the haverim at the Central Committee’s meeting and of the mood of many
citizens of Israel (as well as that of some friends abroad), who were confused
by the personnel change that took place in the Foreign Ministry, and by the
departure of M.S. from the Cabinet – which occurred without an adequate
explanation, or even without any explanation at all. I well knew that this
matter, both in Party discussions and at the Knesset, might indeed cause me
some harm. Had I been motivated, first and foremost, by the stature of the PM
in the eyes of the public, then I would have had no reason to hide anything
from it. On the contrary, I would have had much interest in divulging the
reasons and the motives to the public’s attention.
The restrictions I have put on myself resulted from my
maintaining respect of haverim with
whom I have collaborated over many years. It is with a clean conscience that I
can leave my responsibility for the personnel changes in the Foreign Ministry
to the judgement of the people in days to come. No fault will be found with me
for not making this change beforehand. It is possible that I took into
consideration too much the feelings of friendship and comradely collaboration
in state matters.
Since 1933 I have been responsible for the outlining of
the political course of the Zionist movement and the yishuv as head of the Zionist Executive.
From May 24, 1948 I was responsible for the fixing of the
political course of independent Israel – until I left the Government for
personal reasons sometime at the end of 1953.
M.S. was my chief aide in all political matters. And in
the establishment of the Jewish battalions in World War II and in the
attainment of the Jewish Brigade he had taken the biggest part, and I regard
this important project first and foremost as his achievement.
M.S. was not always in agreement with the course I took,
but even though he had hesitated at some junctions of fateful decisions, he
always collaborated with me in a friendly manner.
Our first [contentious] episode came in the days of the Provisional
Government, when he disagreed with me on a vital matter and overrode me by his
own vote.*
* NOTE: Reference
is to the vote taken on September 26, 1948, on BG’s proposal that the IDF
occupy the southern part of the West Bank, including Bethlehem and Hebron.
According to the protocol, the proposal was defeated by a vote of 7:5 (!) but
there are other versions showing a 6:5 vote. This episode was defined by BG as
an occasion for the “weeping of generations to come” (b'chiya ledorot). The essence and many
contradictions of the phrase and its users are examined in an Annex to Moshe Sharett, Davar Davur [Speaking Out: The Collected Speeches of
Israel’s First Foreign Minister, 1948], eds. Yaakov and Rina Sharett (Tel
Aviv: Moshe Sharett Heritage Society, 2013), 619-43.
I am not at all sure he is
happy with and proud of the position he took then, but it is my opinion that by
it he caused a tremendous, immeasurable national failure: the loss of Old
Jerusalem, of the Samaria areas and of the northern Dead Sea.
There was no collective responsibility in the Provisional
Government, and I could not afford a governmental crisis in view of the serious
political and military campaigns [then underway].
It is with satisfaction that I note that M.S. did not
repeat his mistake when I proposed later the expulsion of the Egyptians from
southern Judea and finally from the Negev, too.
Since then and up to my departure from the Government
there did not occur even one instance of a vital political decision taken
against me under the influence of M.S. He tried to make use of his influence
when he was away at the UN General Assembly in order to prevent the moving of
the Government to Jerusalem, according to my proposal, but his opinion was not
accepted by the Party and by the Cabinet, and – in spite of his and his
counselors’ opinion – Jerusalem has become the capital of Israel both in theory
and in practice.
M.S. tendered me his resignation at the time, but I did
not accept it. I even did not divulge this to the haverim; I only informed M.S. of it in a letter to him in New York,
saying that [such] disagreements are not enough of a reason for leaving [the
Government].*
*NOTE: See exchange of correspondence in DFPI 4 (1949), docs.490 and 498.
In November 1953 I left the Government for personal
reasons, since there was a necessity for a respite “for a year, two years or
more” from the psychological tension bearing on me incessantly for more than
twenty years, as I explained in my letter to the President.
In accordance with my suggestion, P. Lavon was then
nominated Minister of Defense. M.S. was nominated Prime Minister – not in
accordance with my opinion, but without my objections. I appreciated Moshe’s
abilities, knowledge and diligence, but I did not think him capable of
performing a leading and decisive role since he was devoid of boldness,
foresight and understanding of complicated political situations. But I felt I
had no right to intervene actively at a time when I myself had given up
responsibility.
After what happened in Egypt to our people (and to this
very day it is not clear to me who was responsible for it), P.L. left the
Ministry of Defense. I proposed nominating Shaul [Avigur in his place], but he
refused.
In mid-February a delegation (Golda and Namir) came to me
in the name of haverim and in the
name of M.S., asking me to return to the Ministry of Defense. I had personal
and other reasons for continuing my work in Sde Boker, but the fear of moral
deterioration inside the IDF tilted the scales. I informed the two emissaries
of my readiness to return to the Ministry of Defense.
Without my approval this was immediately announced on Kol-Israel. On Sunday [February
20, 1955] M.S came to me at Sde Boker and we conversed about the security
situation and about the Ministry of Defense. I told Moshe that I disagreed with
the change he made during my absence – the transfer of negotiations with the UN
Observers from the Ministry of Defense to the Foreign Ministry. M.S. tried to
convince me that this arrangement was justified and desirable. In the meantime
evening set in and I did not want him to drive back in darkness. We thus parted
in disagreement over this matter.
Next day I came to Jerusalem, since on that day M.S. had
to table at the Knesset the Cabinet’s decision to co-opt me into the Government
as Minister of Defense. On that same day I wrote a letter to Moshe, informing
him that, if he insisted on his opinion concerning negotiations with the UN
Observers being carried on by the Foreign Ministry, he would have to look for
another Minister of Defense.
I did not receive an answer, but in the afternoon, at the
Knesset, I was proposed by M.S. as nominee for Minster of Defense and after a
debate this was approved.
I was quite astonished by this procedure, but Moshe
explained to me later that he had not managed to read my letter to him before
coming to the Knesset since he had been busy composing the speech he was about
to make at the Knesset.
During the six months of my service as Defense Minister,
two vital matters were decided upon against my opinion – by a Cabinet majority
composed by [ministers of] the General Zionists, Hapo’el Hamizrahi, M.S, Rosen, and one or two of our Party’s ministers:
(a) Leaving the Gaza Strip in the hands of Nasser, in spite his
violations of the Armistice Agreements and the turning of the Gaza Strip into a
base for anti-Israeli terror, this at a time during which he was enmeshed in a
serious crisis with Britain and we would have been able to expel him overnight
without a cock’s crowing in the international arena;
(b) The rejection of my second proposal of announcing that the
violation of the Armistice Agreement by Egypt would release us from the
obligations this agreement imposed on us.
On one occasion, I informed our haverim in the Cabinet that after the [November 1955] elections I
would not be a participant in a government which pursued such a security policy
and would not support it.
And since I knew the days of this government were
numbered in any event, I avoided creating a crisis, even though I had enough
reasons to do so, but I resolved to adopt self-restraint. I also resolved to
accept M.S.’s decisions as Prime Minister without objection, whether or not I
happened to agree or disagree with him, and I also told him so.
During the election campaign I spoke in my speech in
Be’ersheva about the importance of the south and of Eilat, and I announced
that, if I were asked to form a government after the elections, I would not
accept the blockade which was in contradiction with the UN Charter and with the
Security Council’s decisions, and that we would put an end to this blockade by
IDF force unless the UN was powerful enough to do this.
I was happy and surprised to read in the next morning’s
papers that, on the same previous evening, M.S. had spoken too on this subject
and had pronounced (although in different terminology, of course) the same
position regarding the breaking of the blockade in the Red Sea.
I felt happy about it, because I saw the breaking of the
blockade as a vital need for the state. I discussed this subject with Rosen,
who was always among those opposing my “daring” proposals, even though he
admitted in one of the Cabinet meetings that, in all the disagreements between
us, he realized later that I had been right and he had been wrong.
To my astonishment, Rosen was in full agreement with the
plan of breaking the blockade.
As is well known, constituting the Cabinet took a long
time, and the basic principles [of the coalition government] agreed upon were
not relevant to the new situation created by the Czechoslovak arms deal and the
great Egyptian danger. I drafted a speech that I would give in the Knesset, and
I brought it to the knowledge of the ministers-to-be. They all approved the
text. M.S. was out of the country at then time, and I sent him the draft of my
speech by special air courier. He proposed some minor linguistic corrections,
but he too approved its contents.
One of the disagreements between me and Moshe was over my
principle never to make public or inform representatives of foreign governments
about moves we do not intend to make. M.S. was of the opinion that in certain
instances we should do so in order to “plant fear”, in order to extort
concessions, even if he had not planned to put into action what he said to
other governments for the sake of “frightening” them. For instance, he informed
the French Minister (and possibly to others), without my knowledge, that we
were going to renew work in the Jordan channel on March 1 [1956]. I don’t agree
with this method. I shall not say something which I am not going to implement.
And therefore I had no doubt that the haverim
agreed with what I said in the Knesset on November 2, both in theory and in
practice. But, to my dismay, I became aware that I was mistaken. When I
proposed – after satisfactory preparations on the General Staff – a plan for
breaking the blockade, I encountered an opposition by a majority of the Cabinet
ministers, headed by M.S.
Had there not been no such serious danger of Egypt’s
waging war on us, I would not have hesitated for one moment to tend my
resignation from the Government immediately. But I was apprehensive of the
resulting impact on the morale of the people and the IDF, and I chose
self-restraint.
After I had warned Burns that Egypt had
to cease fire and implement the Armistice Agreement, and after Burns tried
influencing the Egyptian Government but was unsuccessful – I proposed the
establishment of a new settlement in Be’erotayim, in the Nitzana area. Mapam,
Hapo’el Hamizrahi. Rosen, and one or two of our haverim under the leadership of M.S. vetoed this. I claimed that
this was not prohibited by the Armistice Agreement, nor by the UN or by the
Security Council, and in my conversation with Burns I had announced that not
only was the establishment of one kibbutz not prohibited, but even the
establishment of ten kibbutzim – if only we found them necessary, since we had
agreed on demilitarization of the area, not to its barrenness. But the majority
opposed [my proposal] for fear of UN censure.
Again I opted for self-restraint, but I realized I was
confronted by a united majority in the Cabinet – Mapam, Rosen, Hapo’el
Hamizrahi, M.S. and one or two of our haverim
against the majority of our haverim,
a majority which I felt did not reflect the opinion of most of the people. And
I notified the haverim that if I ever
saw moral grounds for leaving the government, I would do so; and not only that,
but that I would fight against this policy which to my mind was not in
accordance with the vital interests of the state.
I have reached, with much sorrow, a second conclusion:
after my departure from the government M.S.’s haughtiness grew and as a result
he was shouldering responsibilities for which he lacked the necessary inner
strength.*
*NOTE: BG uses a
Hebrew phrase here which cannot be translated literally. In Hebrew: “Hu
lokea’kh al akhrayuto d’varim b’li samkhut maspika”. By “samkhut maspika” BG means MS is not of
sufficient stature, or with a strong enough personality, to allow him to make
fateful decisions relying only on himself – like he, BG, presumably could.
“The straw which broke up the camel’s back” happened on a
marginal matter. At the meeting of the Party’s Committee of Nine, when the
nominating of an authoritative candidate for the post of Party General
Secretary was discussed, somebody proposed Golda for the post, and somebody
else proposed Eshkol. M.S. suggested himself for it.
The matter was not decided at that meeting, and I
discussed this with several haverim.
I discussed it, of course, with M.S. too. I was astonished upon hearing from
him that he did not intend at all to become General Secretary, and that he had
suggested himself for this post only in order to make it easier for Golda to
accept it....
I have never valued M.S.’s decision-making ability when
facing complicated and fateful political questions, but I had no doubts about
his moral integrity. His words regarding his disingenuous suggestion shocked
me.
I felt I could not go on anymore in the existing setup. I
said this to the haverim. M.S. had
demanded a decision by the [Party’s] Political Committee, since all our haverim in the Cabinet were also
approved by a central organ [of the Party]. His demand was accepted. I called
up Moshe and in the presence of Shaul I told him I did not want to explain to
the Political Committee why I insist on his leaving the Foreign Ministry (a) because I did not want to disqualify him in front of the haverim; (b) because I was pretty certain that everything I would
say would appear in the evening papers and in other papers, perhaps with
additional distortions.
I did not vote against him in the Political Committee.
Rather, I suggested to him that I would leave the government, Golda would be
Foreign Minister, Shaul or Moshe Dayan or somebody of their caliber would be
Defense Minister and M.S. would be Prime Minister, since I would be able to
support him as Party General Secretary only if there was a government in which
foreign and security policies were managed by two people who would implement
the policy I had outlined in my speech at the Knesset on November 2, 1955,
courageously and with conviction.
M.S. announced that he was not going to be a member of
such a Cabinet. On the next day I decided to convene our Cabinet haverim and tell them I was not going to
take part in the Political Committee’s meeting and that there was no need for
this, since I was leaving the government.
A few of the haverim
possibly understood why I was convening our Cabinet haverim. And by noon Ziama and Pinhas Sapir came to me and
informed me that M.S. had waived his demand for the Political Committee meeting
and that he was leaving the government.
In the meantime false news appeared in the papers,
especially abroad, that I had proposed M.S. for the post of Party General
Secretary in order to oust him from the government.
I was surprised that M.S. did not deny this fabrication.
On Monday, 18/6/1956, I convened the Cabinet and at that
meeting M.S. announced his resignation. On the same day the Cabinet decided to
nominate Golda as Foreign Minister and to have Namir join the Cabinet. On the
same evening I announced these changes in the Knesset.
Before coming to the Knesset I sent Moshe the draft of my
speech (a very short “speech”); he suggested a few additions regarding his [past] activity, which I accepted, and then I said what I said in the Knesset.
Moshe spoke immediately after me. And again I was
surprised that had not felt it necessary to deny the fabrication concerning my
proposal that he become Party General Secretary, although he did deny some [other] fabrications which appeared in the papers.
Next day I decided to speak again in the Knesset, to
clear up some obscurities and to deny the fabrication concerning my proposal
that he become Party General Secretary. I telephoned Moshe and informed him
that I was going to say that he was the first to table that proposal (of
becoming Party General Secretary). He suggested that I say that I had heard
from him for the first time about the “possibility’ (of his becoming Party
General Secretary). I was somewhat surprised at this inexact wording, but I
accepted it and used the terminology he suggested to me.
All the rest is known.
To one of the haverim
who wrote me a letter on this matter, I summed up my opinion in a few
sentences [see WebDoc #128]:
You are as much aware of
Moshe’s many talents and qualities as I am. And I have no doubt at all that in
a country like Denmark, which primarily deals with courteous trade relations
with her neighbors, he could be an excellent Foreign Minister. Israel, to my
deep regret, is not Denmark. From time to time she faces serious political
conflicts and fateful decisions which demand a great deal of foresight, courage
and a deep understanding of concrete factors and circumstances, not symbols and
rhetoric, in order to steer the storm-bound ship to safe harbor through the
treacherous seas that beset it.
An ability for literate expression and for explaining matters is not enough, and the abilities necessary for standing at the helm have, to my dismay, never been at the command of M.S. Negative avoidance by “sitting put” and doing nothing is not enough. The preference for not doing is at times fraught with much more dangerous future results than any daring and fateful deeds.
Three instances of “sitting put” – decided upon in the
days of the Provisional Government and in the last two Cabinets against my
opinion by M.S.’s inspiration and leadership – shall cost our people very
dearly. In my view the end of the tether has been reached, and no wise man
could have expected that I would – in the long run – be a party to a failing
policy.
